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I. INTRODUCTION 
In the face of ultra-partisan polarization, it is unsurprising that much of public 
concern and scholarly attention on distortions in political representation should be 
spent on those relating to partisan fairness. Notably, recent unsuccessful attempts 
to persuade the Supreme Court to set out manageable standards for adjudicating 
partisan gerrymandering claims in federal courts are a good example of the 
contemporary interest and demand for judicial solutions to partisan problems in 
our representative democracy. 1  These attempts are surely laudable and their 
failure is surely regrettable.2 But reiteration from the Supreme Court that it will not 
involve federal courts in contestation over partisan gerrymandering also reminds 
us that the primary legal protections for the right to vote, both in the 
Reconstruction Amendments and in the Voting Rights Act, concern racial equality 
in voting.  
This reminder is a timely one. On the cusp of a new redistricting cycle, we 
must ask what progress can and should be made towards the goal of racial equality 
in representation. And this question should be asked specifically of Native 
representation. In tracing the empirical progress that our laws have facilitated in 
racial equality in redistricting, Native American voters are rarely the focus of either 
policy or scholarly discussions. Put simply, it is especially important that the twin 
questions posed by the symposium—“where are we now, and where might we 
be”—be asked of Native representation. 
Seizing the opportunity presented by this Symposium, this Article considers 
the ongoing threats to dilution of Native votes and the prospect that the legal 
system will adequately protect against them in the upcoming round of redistricting. 
As redistricting happens only once every decade, missed opportunities to make 
progress towards racial equity in political representation are especially frustrating. 
 
* Ph.D. candidate in Political Science, Stanford University; JD, Stanford Law School 2016. 
1. See, e.g., Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1933 (2018); Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 
2484, 2507–08 (2019). 
2. For full disclosure, I worked on the partisan gerrymandering challenge to Ohio’s congressional 
map. Ohio A. Philip Randolph Inst. v. Householder, 373 F. Supp. 3d 978 (S.D. Ohio 2019) (vacated). 
 IDAHO LAW REVIEW VOL. 56 
 
324 
This Article considers what opportunities might be presented, and the barriers 
faced in taking full advantage of them. 
II. REDISTRICTING MATH  
To explore the representational opportunities for Native voters, I begin with 
redistricting math: how many Native persons there are, and where do they reside? 
To be sure, whether redistricting can achieve representational goals depends on far 
more than population size and dispersion. But redistricting math is a good place to 
start from. At its core, redistricting is drawing lines to divide population across space. 
For Native Americans, both of the central variables in redistricting math, population 
and space, are also features of the most dire consequences resulting from the 
arrival of white inhabitants on the continent. The decimation of Native 
communities, along with the influx of white inhabitants, is population dilution at its 
most extreme. Condemnation of America’s first inhabitants to not only a numerical 
minority, but an ultra-numerical minority, is reflected in land mass as well as 
population size, as evidenced by scattered fragments of tribal land, concentrated 
largely in the Mountain West. 
The scarcity and dispersion of a minority community provide the 
mathematical foundation for whether and how much representation can be 
achieved through redistricting.  And these factors also determine at which level of 
government representation can and should be expected. Numerical size and 
concentration matter in redistricting because representation is typically achieved 
through obtaining a numerical majority at the district level. Thus, the more 
numerous and more concentrated the community, the easier it is to attain majority 
in the various districts drawn in the area. As districts are drawn at various state and 
local levels (school district, county commission, state upper and lower houses, and 
the U.S. House of Representatives), even very small minority communities could 
obtain representation through some (very small) districts if such communities can 
command a regional majority within the boundaries of those districts. 
So what is the state of redistricting math for Native communities? In order to 
properly contextualize reality, first consider some extreme hypotheticals of Native 
population dispersion. In doing so, we assume, as is true of 2010 census figures, 
that Native persons constitute less than 2% of the total US population. 3 But as 
alluded to above, numerical minority does not, by itself, doom representation in 
redistricting. Much depends on how that population is spread out. First, consider 
how the voting strength of the little over 5 million Native persons might be 
maximized for national representation.4 Five million persons can constitute a bare 
majority in the eleven least populous states in the Union (excluding D.C.).5 Thus, in 
this hypothetical, Native persons could elect their desired senators and at least 
several House members from these states as well. 
At the other end of the spectrum, imagine that Native persons were spread 
out across the nation’s eleven most populous states such that they constituted 1.5% 
 
3. TINA NORRIS ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, THE AMERICAN INDIAN AND ALASKA NATIVE POPULATION: 2010, 
at 3 (2012). 
4. See id. 
5. See PAUL MACKUN & STEVEN WILSON, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, POPULATION. DISTRIBUTION AND CHANGE: 
2000 TO 2010, at 2 (2011) (for total population figures of all states). 
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or less of each state’s population. The possibility of electing representatives of 
choice at the national or even statewide level is foreclosed. To be sure, 
representatives of choice could be elected at the local level, but that would depend 
additionally on how the population is dispersed within states.  
What these two extremes demonstrate is that voting strength, at least at the 
national level, is maximized when minority communities are concentrated in 
otherwise not highly populated place. Reality, perhaps predictably, is somewhere 
in between the extremes. Concentration of remaining tribal lands in the otherwise 
relatively sparsely populated Mountain West aids voting strength. Putting aside 
Hawaii and Alaska, Native persons constitute upwards of 10% of the population of 
South Dakota, New Mexico, and Oklahoma.6 Many other Western states house 
more than the national average of Native persons: Wyoming, North Dakota, 
Montana, Idaho, Nevada, Kansas, Oregon, Colorado, Arizona, and Washington.7 To 
be sure, the numbers of Native persons in none of these states are sufficient to 
constitute a majority. Thus, redistricting math does not promote the election of 
candidates of choice at the national level. But in state legislative bodies, election of 
candidates of choice is possible in several Western states if the population is 
sufficiently concentrated and not cracked by district lines. 
However, relative concentration in the West only half describes where Native 
persons reside. Dispersion is also true of the Native community. Only 41% of the 
Native population live in the West. 8 Many live in populous states and cities in the 
Northeast.9 And even within the West, Native persons are not maximally positioned 
for voting strength as they are concentrated in highly populous states. For instance, 
almost 14% of the Native population live in California, where it constitutes a little 
less than 2% of the total population there.10 The same is true to a lesser extent in 
Arizona and Texas, too.11 
Moreover, state boundaries crack Native land—and population—within the 
West and elsewhere. The most prominent example of this is the Navajo Nation, the 
largest land-based Native reservation and the second most populous tribe.12 Its 
population is essentially cracked by the state boundaries of Arizona and New 
Mexico (and to a lesser extent, of Utah).13 Another example is how the boundary 
between North and South Dakota split the Standing Rock Indian Reservation.14 Thus, 
 
6. See NORRIS ET AL., supra note 3, at 7. 
7. Id. 
8. Supra NORRIS ET AL., supra note 3, at 5 (41% of the American Indian and Alaska Native population 
lived in the West).  
9. Id. at 7, 11. 
10. Id. at 6, 8. 
11. Id. 
12. NAVAJO DIV. OF HEALTH & NAVAJO EPIDEMIOLOGY CTR., NAVAJO POPULATION PROFILE: 2010 U.S. CENSUS 
41 (2013), https://www.nec.navajo-nsn.gov/Portals/0/Reports/NN2010PopulationProfile.pdf. 
13. Id. 
14. Statistics, STANDING ROCK SIOUX TRIBE, https://www.standingrock.org/content/statistics (last 
visited May 20, 2020). 
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even in the Mountain West, where Native population is concentrated, it is also 
dispersed.  
III. FROM REDISTRICTING MATH TO REPRESENTATION 
What does redistricting math for the Native community, characterized by 
both concentration and dispersal, mean for prospects of Native representation? 
Based purely on the redistricting math of small population numbers and relative 
dispersal across states, national representation would appear to be exceedingly 
difficult. Statewide offices would also appear to be far out of reach. In states where 
Native voters constitute a concentrated minority, state legislative offices could be 
won. And of course, localized concentration should give rise to many opportunities 
for local elected offices elected from sufficiently small districts in which Native 
voters constitute a majority. Yet reality diverges from what redistricting math 
would predict in revealing ways.  
A. National and Statewide 
Native representation at the national level perhaps most aptly demonstrates 
how redistricting math, while sometimes a powerful determinant of representation, 
is not universally applicable. Native communities’ position as an ultra-numerical 
minority, at least nationally, puts them at a severe disadvantage in redistricting 
math at the national level. And yet Native representatives have historically been 
elected both to the Senate and the House of Representatives. 15  Indeed, many 
Native representatives have been elected to national offices even before Native 
persons were given the right to vote pursuant to the Indian Citizenship Act of 
1924,16 and before the 1975 extension to the Voting Rights Act that helped Native 
eligible voters actually register to vote and vote.17 
To be sure, the list of Native members of Congress is not a long one. The point 
here is not to cast judgment on the sufficiency of Native representation at the 
national level. It is simply to observe that representational benchmarks cannot be 
cast purely based on redistricting math. And here I group statewide office along 
with national ones because statewide offices can be just as hard—if not harder—to 
win than certain national-level offices. Like with U.S. senators, many state offices, 
for instance governor, lieutenant governor, or secretary of state, are elected 
statewide. By contrast, congressional representatives only need to win the votes of 
a majority of a congressional district. Thus, to set representational goals purely 
based on redistricting math for statewide offices would be as—if not more—
fallacious than doing the same for national offices. Regardless, considering 
 
15. See CONGR. RESEARCH SERV., MEMORANDUM: MEMBERS OF CONGRESS OF AMERICAN INDIAN DESCENT 
(2013) (congressional librarians advised that as this list was last compiled in 2013, it does not include 
Representatives Sharice Davids (D, Kansas Third District) and Deb Haaland (D, New Mexico First District) 
who were elected to the House of Representatives in 2019) (on file with author). 
16. See DANIEL MCCOOL ET AL., NATIVE VOTE: AMERICAN INDIANS, THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT, AND THE RIGHT TO 
VOTE 8 (2007). The passage of the Act did not mean that Native voters were eligible to vote in all states. 
Id. The road from the Act to actual enfranchisement of Native persons was long as states continued to 
deny Native persons the right to vote through other means. Id.; LAUGHLIN MCDONALD, AMERICAN INDIANS 
AND THE FIGHT FOR EQUAL VOTING RIGHTS 19 (2010). 
17. See MCCOOL ET AL., supra note 16; see also MCDONALD, supra note 16, at 26. 
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statewide offices in states with prominent percentages of Native persons, 
representation is very limited. 
Looking forward to progress that can be made, quality of the representation 
reflected should count as much as quantity: Native representation at the national 
level itself could be more representative of Native persons. The election of 
Representatives Davids and Haaland in 2018 not only doubled the number of Native 
representatives in Congress,18 but it also brought Native women to Congress for the 
first time19 as a part of a broader national wave of increased female representation 
at all levels of government. 
Representational progress should also be made towards more geographic 
diversity. There remain several states with significant Native population that have 
never elected a Native representative to Congress (including but not limited to 
Alaska)—or statewide office.20  
Given the significant numerical hurdles that Native representation faces at 
both the state and national level, progress should be measured not only in victories, 
but also in attempts. That each election brings record numbers of Native Americans 
running for office21 is progress in and of itself. And just as elected representatives 
are more reflective of the diversity of the Native community, aspiring office-holders 
are, too.22 Regardless of eventual electoral success, Native candidates seize the 
opportunity presented by elections to educate the electorate on Native concerns, 
challenge stereotypes, and encourage young Native voters to vote.23 While these 
gains are harder to put in numbers and figures, they are no less important. 
B. State Legislative 
The growing corps of Native candidates for high-level state and national 
offices reflect the fruition of decades-long work to enhance Native representation 
at the state legislative level. The political significance of ensuring representation at 
all levels of government, including local and state legislative offices, is obvious given 
the importance of political experience in office-seeking.24 And while redistricting 
can do little to aid national and statewide representation of Native communities, it 
has been central to achieving Native representation in state legislatures.  
 
18. Leila Fadel & Talia Weiner, Record Number of Native Americans Running for Office in Midterms, 
NPR (July 4, 2018, 7:30 AM), https://www.npr.org/2018/07/04/625425037/record-number-of-native-
americans-running-for-office-in-midterms.  
19. Id. 
20. See CONG. RESEARCH SERV., supra note 15, for a list of elected Native national representatives. 
See, e.g., Joe Heim, Native American Women Candidates Seek Historic Wins in November, WASH. POST 
(Oct. 12, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/native-american-women-candidates-seek-
historic-wins-in-november/2018/10/12/7df3064c-c10e-11e8-9005-5104e9616c21_story.html (noting 
that Idaho has never elected a Native governor). 
21. Fadel & Weiner, supra note 19.  
22. Id.  
23. Id. 
24. See, e.g., id. 
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Redistricting math is vital at the state legislative level because deviations from 
redistricting math can be legally actionable. The legal provision protecting Native 
communities from having their votes diluted in the redistricting process is Section 
2 of the Voting Rights Act. 25  In the state legislative redistricting process, this 
provision protects Native communities from being cracked. Cracking refers to the 
“dispersal of [protected minority voters] into districts in which they constitute an 
ineffective minority of voters.”26 
Note that cracking includes both mechanical and behavioral elements. At a 
purely mechanical level, cracking involves dividing a minority group across several 
districts so that it cannot constitute a majority in any. But for the mechanical 
cracking to be successful in preventing a minority group from electing their 
candidates of choice, a behavioral component—of racially polarized voting—must 
also be present. Racially polarized voting occurs when voters of different races 
cohesively vote for different candidates. To see why racially polarized voting 
matters for minority ability to elect, consider if it were not present. If non-Native 
voters are willing to vote in sufficient numbers for the Native candidate of choice, 
then Native voters do not need to constitute a majority in order to elect their 
candidate of choice. But when voting is polarized, i.e., when Native voters vote 
cohesively for a candidate of choice and when non-Native voters vote cohesively 
for their (different) candidate of choice, mechanical cracking accomplishes dilution 
of voting strength. 
Unsurprisingly, the threshold factors for Section 2 claims involve both the 
mechanical and behavioral underpinnings of cracking.27 To challenge a districting 
scheme for vote dilution under Section 2, the protected minority group must 
demonstrate that it is “sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute 
a majority in a single-member district.” 28  This fact ensures that a remedy for 
cracking is possible: that a majority-minority district can be drawn. Then, the 
touchstone of a Section 2 claim is proving racially polarized voting: that non-Native 
voters are “usually [] able to defeat candidates supported by [] politically cohesive, 
geographically insular” Native voters.29 
Section 2 has played a transformative role in safeguarding Native voting 
strength at the state legislative level, where both mechanical and behavioral 
underpinnings of cracking were amply present. The stakes of enforcing Section 2 at 
the state legislative level are high: in states with sizeable Native populations, the 
state legislative level is often the highest level of representation that redistricting 
math supports through the creation of majority-minority districts. And even with 
clear statutory protections for Native voting rights under Section 2, litigation—
often protracted—has been necessary to actually create Native-majority districts. 
In Montana, a Section 2 challenge to create and maintain Native-majority districts 
spanned eight years and both the 1990 and 2000 redistricting cycle.30 In South 
Dakota, while a blatant mid-decade redistricting plan to eliminate a majority-Native 
 
25. The 1975 amendment to the Voting Rights Act put minorities, including Native persons, under 
the protection of the Act. MCDONALD, supra note 16, at 34–36. 
26. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 46 n.11 (1986). 
27. Id. at 49. 
28. Id. at 50. 
29. Id. at 49. 
30. MCDONALD, supra note 16, at 99–116. 
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district was eventually struck down on state constitutional grounds, it was also 
clearly violative of Section 2.31  
Success of Section 2 in protecting Native communities from vote dilution 
should be measured not only in litigation brought pursuant to the Act, but also in 
actions taken to avoid litigation. Section 2 is not self-enforcing: actionable claims 
must be enforced through litigation. But knowledge that Section 2 claims could 
have been brought if Native communities were cracked in a state legislative plan 
likely deterred line drawers from doing so. 
Empirically, the success of Section 2 is also hard to disentangle from that of 
Section 5 of the same Act, known as the preclearance regime, in preventing vote 
dilution in localities subject to Section 5. While Section 2 applies nationwide, 
Section 5 was applicable only to localities included in the coverage formula under 
Section 4 of the Act. 32  Preclearance required covered jurisdictions to submit 
changes in voting laws or practices for federal approval before they could be 
implemented.33 And redistricting was certainly the kind of change in voting law or 
practice that was subject to preclearance. The 1975 amendment to the Voting 
Rights Act not only brought Native persons under the protection of the Act, but also 
put the states of Alaska, Arizona, and Texas under the preclearance regime, along 
with many smaller jurisdictions within states (for our purposes, the notable ones 
include Todd and Shannon Counties in South Dakota).34 To be sure, as Section 5 is 
no longer operative following the Supreme Court’s decision in Shelby County v. 
Holder,35 it is of no help to protecting Native communities from vote dilution in the 
upcoming cycle. But looking back, the historic requirement of preclearance for 
Alaska and Arizona’s redistricting plans likely did much to prevent vote dilution of 
Native communities there. 
Regardless of the precise mechanism by which the Voting Rights Act, either 
through Section 2 or Section 5, by deterrence or actual enforcement, protected 
Native voters from vote dilution, its influence on how state legislative districts were 
drawn was more than clear by the 2010 redistricting cycle. In many of the states 
with significant Native voters, Native representatives were elected to state 
legislatures, almost exclusively elected through majority-Native districts. And the 
role that the Act has played in ensuring that redistricting math gives rise to 
representation is clearly evident in the many firsts in Native representation that the 
provision produced.36 
In the next round of redistricting, Native voters face a different kind of vote 
dilution threat. It is packing, not cracking, that threatens Native representation. 
 
31. Id. at 130. 
32. Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 537 (2013). 
33. Id. 
34. MCDONALD, supra note 16, at 35. 
35. See Shelby County, 570 U.S. at 557. 
36. See, e.g., MCDONALD, supra note 16, at 116 (largest number of Native representatives elected 
to Montana House and Senate); id. at 133 (District 28A in South Dakota electing first Native 
representative from Cheyenne River Sioux Indian Reservation).  
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Recall that cracking involves spreading Native persons across several districts to 
ensure that they cannot constitute a majority in a single district. Packing is the 
opposite: it concentrates Native persons in a single district, often far exceeding a 
majority. As such, packing is a way of cabining Native voting strength and confining 
it to certain districts, depriving Native persons of potentially influencing or even 
constituting a majority in another district. 
Indeed, Native communities are well acquainted with packing as a vote 
dilution strategy. An example of its application can be found in the 2000 round of 
redistricting in South Dakota.37 The prior redistricting cycle resulted in the creation 
of one Native-majority district. Growth in the Native population improved the 
redistricting math, giving rise to an opportunity to create another Native-majority 
district in the 2000 cycle. 38  But instead, Native persons were packed into the 
existing majority-minority district.39 
In some places, a similar scenario is likely to be presented in the upcoming 
redistricting cycle. The Native population has been,40 and is growing at a faster rate 
than that of the general population.41 And as the population is likely to grow either 
in or around existing majority-minority districts, more tightly packing Native 
persons in existing majority-minority districts, initially drawn to increase Native 
voting strength, is likely to be the dominant vote dilution strategy. Many of the 
Native-majority state legislative districts already have landslide majorities (many 
exceeding or approaching 70% in Native VAP).42  New districts that maintain similar 
levels of VAP or even increase VAP will attract litigation. 
In cases where packed districts deprive Native voters of an additional 
majority-minority district, like in South Dakota in 2000, a Section 2 claim is 
available.43 But there will be many instances in which the Section 2 condition that 
the minority community be sufficiently numerous to constitute a majority cannot 
be met. Thus, even if another district with a sizeable Native minority, say between 
 
37. MCDONALD, supra note 16, at 133–34. 
38. Id. 
39. Id. 
40. Between the 2000 and 2010 census, the Native American population increased by 26.7%, 
significantly higher than the general population growth rate of 9.7%. 
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AMERICAN INDIAN AND ALASKA NATIVE HERITAGE MONTH: NOVEMBER 2012, CB12-
FF.22, at 2 (2012). 
41. Projected population growth rates in the Native American population also exceeds that of 
general population growth in the immediate (2020) and distant (2060) future. JONATHAN VESPA, LAUREN 
MEDINA & DAVID M. ARMSTRONG, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, DEMOGRAPHIC TURNING POINTS FOR THE UNITED STATES: 
POPULATION PROJECTIONS FOR 2020 TO 2060, at 7 (2020). 
42. See, e.g., Alaska Senate Districts (“SD”) S & T, and House Districts (“HD”) 38-40; Arizona SD 7, 
and HD 7; Montana SD 16, and HD 32; New Mexico SD 3, 4, & 22, and HD 4-7, 9, 65, 69; North Dakota 
SD 9, HD 9; South Dakota SD 27; HD 26A, 27; Wyoming HD 33. These figures are based on 2010 census 
data, available at CENSUS REPORTER, http://censusreporter.org (last visited May 20, 2020). I do not mean 
to suggest that the existing districts are packed, or that if Native VAP increases in those districts they will 
be packed. To make that determination, one would have to conduct a full Section 2 statistical analysis 
of previous election results and registration rates. My point is simply that if line-drawers further increase 
the Native VAP of already heavily Native-majority districts, especially in ways that result in odd-looking 
districts, those districts would be suggestive of racial gerrymanders and attract litigation. 
43. Shelby County struck down the coverage formula in Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act, which 
applies to the pre-clearance regime set out in Section 5 of the Act. Shelby County v. Holder 570 U.S. 529, 
557 (2013). Section 2, which applies nationwide, remains in effect. Id. at 529. 
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10% and 40%, could be drawn, that might not be sufficient to make out a Section 2 
claim. Such districts are known as minority-influence districts, as they are districts 
in which the minority population is large enough to influence political outcomes. 
Even with racially polarized voting, a cohesive and large enough minority can 
exercise significant influence in who gets elected from the district (along with 
political influence in countless other aspects as well; for instance, over the issues 
candidates must campaign on, or who can prevail in primary elections). 
In addressing these instances of vote dilution of Native voting strength, 
plaintiffs must turn to a different legal claim to vindicate their rights: racial 
gerrymandering. 44  Racial gerrymandering claims arise when race is the 
“predominant factor motivating the legislature’s decision to place a significant 
number of voters within . . . a particular district.”45 Whether these claims are likely 
to succeed depend, of course, on how the packing on racial lines is accomplished. 
Generally, contorted district lines drawn to achieve packing enhance the merits of 
the claim. Whether contorted districts, for instance those with “a finger-like 
extension,”46 “snakelike shape,”47 or resemble a “Rorschach ink-blot test,”48 will 
have to be drawn to pack Native voters will largely depend on where Native 
populations are and where they will grow. 
While the facts of the likely racial gerrymandering claims against packed 
Native districts are to be determined, the law is clear. Racial gerrymandering 
presents an active area of litigation, and many of the Supreme Court’s recent cases 
are relevant. Packing strategies have already faced judicial scrutiny, and the legal 
defense asserted to defend them as necessary to comply with the Voting Rights Act 
has been tested in the last decade. In redistricting plan after redistricting plan that 
the Supreme Court has reviewed in recent years, plaintiffs alleged that majority-
minority districts drawn in prior decades to protect minority voting strength had 
their minority populations kept stagnant or even increased in an effort to pack 
minority voters.49 Often, the state’s legal defense is that drawing districts with a 
particular percentage of minority voting age population (“VAP”; the relevant 
population for redistricting purposes) is required by the Voting Rights Act. And what 
 
44. For background on racial gerrymandering claims, see SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, PAMELA KARLAN, 
RICHARD PILDES & NATHANIEL PERSILY, THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY: LEGAL STRUCTURE OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS (2016).  
45. Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1463 (2017) (citing Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916 
(1995)). 
46. Id. at 1466. 
47. Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 238 (2001). 
48. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 635 (1993). 
49. See, e.g., Ala. Legis. Black Caucus v. Alabama, 575 U.S. 254 (2015) (linedrawers mandated that 
majority-minority districts maintain the same percentage of Black persons as in the past, claiming that 
doing so was necessary to comply with the Voting Rights Act); Wittman v. Personhuballah, 136 S. Ct. 
1732 (2016) (while the case was dismissed on jurisdictional grounds, id. at 1737, the facts of the case 
involved a majority-Black congressional district that had its Black voting age population increased in the 
2010 redistricting cycle. Page v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 58 F. Supp. 3d 533, 539 (E.D. Va. 2014)); 
Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455 (2017) (involving two congressional districts that had consistently 
elected Black representatives of choice but nevertheless had their Black voting age population increased 
in ways that resulted in odd district shapes).  
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the Court made clear, especially in ALBC and Cooper, is that compliance with the 
Voting Rights Act is not based on meeting simplistic numerical targets for minority 
voting age population. 
These decisions will help litigants challenging packed Native majority-minority 
districts drawn in the upcoming redistricting cycle.  Linedrawers cannot simply claim 
that a certain numerical target for Native VAP is necessary to comply with Section 
2 of the Voting Rights Act. Rather, actual compliance with Section 2 requires that 
linedrawers conduct a fact-based inquiry into the voting and registration patterns 
of Native and non-Native voters in the relevant parts of the state. 
The actual percentage of Native VAP necessary for Native voters to elect their 
candidates of choice depends on many factors. For one, if Native voters are less 
likely than non-Native voters to be registered to vote, they face additional hurdles 
in electing their candidates of choice. Also recall that racially-polarized voting is the 
behavioral underpinning for vote dilution strategies. If racially-polarized voting has 
diminished in force, then a district does not need as many Native persons in order 
for the Native candidate-of-choice to be elected. Perhaps by removing the state’s 
ability to rely on bad excuses for packing minority voters, ALBC and Cooper will also 
nudge more linedrawers to conduct the necessary statistical analysis during the 
redistricting process that inform how Section 2 should be complied with. That such 
analysis is conducted during the redistricting process is valuable because not only 
could it be incorporated into legitimate redistricting decisions to protect minority 
voting strength, but also because if it is ignored, litigation can be easily brought (and 
is more likely to be successful). 
C. Local Governments 
As we move to the lowest level of redistricting, redistricting math should be 
at its strongest. Given population concentration at the local level, this is 
theoretically the level of government where representation should be most 
prevalent. And yet actual Native representation at the local level most severely 
underperforms vis-à-vis redistricting math. Indeed, as an initial matter, it is hard to 
even know what the scope of Native representation is at the local level, as national 
summary statistics on office-holding at the local level are rare. In Congress, by 
contrast, there is ample staff maintaining records on office-holders. And at the state 
legislative level, there are groups like the National Caucus of Native American State 
Legislators that compile information on its members (affiliated with the National 
Conference of State Legislatures).50 Given the importance of local governments for 
Native representation, it is regrettable that basic data on Native officeholding at 
the local level is not available. 
To be sure, the same Section 2 that has been transformative in translating 
redistricting math into Native representation in state legislatures also applies to 
local governments. However, the particular mechanism for change is not identical. 
Section 2 claims against state legislative districts are directed at the way in which 
those districts are drawn. That districts are drawn to elect representatives is 
 
50. National Caucus of Native American State Legislators, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, 
https://www.ncsl.org/research/state-tribal-institute/national-caucus-native-american-state-
legislators.aspx (last visited May 20, 2020). 
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practically a foregone conclusion at the state legislative level. But at the local level, 
many representatives are elected at large, not from districts. At-large voting occurs 
when all voters in the jurisdiction vote for all the candidates. For instance, a five-
member city council elected at-large consists of the five candidates who received 
the most votes in the city-wide election. 
At-large voting has a long and ugly history of diluting minority voting 
strength.51 As long as whites have a bare numerical majority and vote cohesively, 
they can defeat minority candidates of choice. This can result in certain jurisdictions 
electing all-white representatives even when minority voters constitute a sizeable 
minority. Indeed, such outcomes can be secured even if the number of minority 
voters in a jurisdiction is only one less than a majority. 
As such, at-large voting schemes at the local level have been the target of 
much of the Native voting rights litigation over the years. In Dan McCool, Susan 
Olson, and Jennifer Robinson’s exhaustive book on Native voting rights litigation, 
the largest category of Native voting rights cases they found involved challenges to 
vote dilution through at-large electoral systems. 52  Many of these cases are 
described by the lawyer who brought them, Laughlin McDonald, in his book 
summarizing a career of defending Native voting rights.53 
Whether Native voting rights at the local level are fully vindicated in local 
redistricting is hard to know. But the factors presenting opportunities for 
representation could arise in the next decade are relatively easy to identify. The 
next redistricting cycle could bring opportunities to challenge at-large voting 
schemes that dilute Native voting strength. Even though at-large voting schemes 
are not affected by a new redistricting cycle, updated census data could bring in 
fresh facts that give rise to a viable Section 2 claim. For a Section 2 challenge to 
prevail against an at-large voting scheme, plaintiffs must demonstrate the same 
preconditions as discussed above in the context of challenging a redistricting 
scheme. 54  Thus, plaintiffs must demonstrate that the Native community is 
sufficiently numerous and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a 
demonstrative district. Updated population figures from the 2020 census reflecting 
population growth such that Native persons could constitute a majority in a 




51. See generally Chandler Davidson, The Voting Rights Act: A Brief History, in CONTROVERSIES IN 
MINORITY VOTING: THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT IN PERSPECTIVE 24–27 (Bernard N. Grofman & Chandler Davidson 
eds., 1992). For a discussion of the application of at-large voting to dilute Native votes, see MCCOOL ET 
AL., supra 17.  
52. MCCOOL ET AL., supra note 1716, at 45. 
53. MCDONALD, supra note 16. 
54. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50–51 (1986). 
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IV. When Redistricting Math Fails 
But opportunities presented by population growth should not be overstated. 
Even where meritorious legal claims exist, a variety of practical reasons might 
conspire to prevent legal rights from being vindicated. And in Native voting rights 
cases specifically, the practical costs of vindicating voting rights are high. Without 
the preclearance regime, it is those seeking to protect Native voting rights who bear 
the burden of proof—and the burdens of litigation. Underperformance of Native 
voting strength in local governments is not due to redistricting math, but litigation 
math: there are too many potential defendants, and too few lawyers to bring 
meritorious cases. And what is especially frustrating about the high costs of 
litigation in the context of protecting Native voting rights is that as expensive as 
litigation is, it is often the only way to achieve meaningful change.55  
And change, even with the help of a court of law, is painstakingly hard to 
achieve. The decades-long attempts by the Navajos to be represented in San Juan 
County, Utah, demonstrates this point all too well. Long a numerical majority in San 
Juan County, the Navajos could not elect a majority of the commissioners through 
single-member districts to the San Juan County Commission until 2018. The recent 
electoral success of Navajo representatives is not a straightforward or satisfying 
success story for Native American representation. The experience there is 
emblematic not only of hard-won change achieved so far, but also of the many 
struggles still ahead for protecting Native voting rights in the redistricting process.  
The fight for Native voting rights in San Juan County, like those elsewhere, is 
nothing new. San Juan County now elects its county commissioners and school 
board members56 through single-member districts only because of prior Section 2 
litigation by the Department of Justice.57 As the tale so often goes, the county 
previously elected its elected officials through at-large voting, and though Native 
Americans constituted a substantial portion of the county’s population, no Native 
representatives were ever elected.58 In 1983, the Department of Justice sued over 
the at-large electoral scheme under Section 2, and the case ultimately settled.59 
As a part of the consent decree to the DOJ-brought litigation, single-member 
districts were drawn.60 One district (out of three total districts) was almost 89% in 
Native population, and in 1986, elected the first Native representative in San Juan 
County.61 Indeed, the district continued to elect only Native representatives.62 But 
reform of the electoral structure was only one among many reforms needed to fully 
ensure Native voting rights. Even as representation reached a new equilibrium (two 
white and one Native commissioners), federal monitors had to be deployed in San 
 
55. Whatever the merits of John Hart Ely’s process theory, it is simply factually the case that 
dilution of Native voting strength is accomplished through the political process, and thus the judicial 
branch is the only branch of government that can provide recourse.  
56. While both the county commissioner and school board districts are heavily contested, I focus 
on the county commissioner districts in this piece for sake of brevity. 
57. Navajo Nation v. San Juan Cty., 162 F. Supp. 3d 1162, 1166 (2016). 
58. Id.  
59. Id. at 1167. 
60. Id. at 1167–68. 
61. Id. at 1168. 
62. Id. 
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Juan County to ensure that election administration was fair and that Native voters 
had equal access to the ballot.63 
As will become clear again and again as the story of San Juan County unfolds, 
one-time gains made towards securing Native voting rights can easily backslide. “If 
you don’t move forward, sooner or later you begin to move backward.”64 And in 
San Juan County, between 1986 and 2011, the system was literally stuck in place—
even as the world kept spinning. The county did not redraw their districts, even as 
three decades of updated census data came and went.65 While there is no legal 
requirement that the county redistrict after every decennial census, redistricting 
following each decennial census is presumed.66 The raison d’etre of redistricting is 
to update districting lines based on demographic changes (not simply changes in 
total population, but also of residential patterns). But such updating did not occur 
in San Juan County.67 
Calcified district lines from three decades ago failed to adapt to changing 
population trends in the county. As each census came and went, the 1986 districts 
became increasingly malapportioned, meaning that the population totals in the 
districts became more and more imbalanced, deviating more and more from the 
principle of one-person, one-vote. 68  Native Americans had also become 
exceedingly packed into the predominantly Native district, constituting over 92% of 
the district.69  With Native Americans comprising around 30% in the other two 
districts,70 it was becoming all too clear that the old district lines were both packing 
and cracking Native voters.  
Of course, the Navajo community lobbied the Commission throughout the 
years to revisit the district boundaries, but to no avail. Finally, under severe 
community pressure, the County altered its districts in 2011 for the first time since 
1986.71 But the changes made were de minimus: two voting precincts were moved 
from one predominantly white district to the other predominantly white district.72 
Faced with decades-long intransigence and little more than token responsiveness, 
the Navajo Nation brought suit challenging the 2011 districts.73 
Five years after the suit was first brought, the district court decided in favor 
of the plaintiffs, and ordered that new districts be drawn by a special master after 
 
63. Navajo Nation, 162 F. Supp. 3d at 1169. 
64 . If You Don't Move Forward-You Begin to Move Backward, HARV. MAG. (Dec. 5, 2007), 
https://harvardmagazine.com/breaking-news/if-you-dont-move-forward-you-begin-move-backward. 
This quote is courtesy of Gorbachev, who made these remarks when he visited Harvard in 2007.  
65. Navajo Nation, 162 F. Supp. 3d at 1169. 
66. Id. 
67. Id. 
68. Id. at 1169–70. The one-person, one-vote principle comes from the seminal case of Reynolds 
v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).  
69. Navajo Nation, 162 F. Supp. 3d at 1171. 
70. Id. 
71. Id. at 1170–71. 
72. Id. at 1171. 
73. Id. 
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rejecting the proposed remedial maps from both plaintiffs and defendants for both 
legal and prudential reasons.74 The court also ordered that the county hold special 
elections under the map drawn by the special master in November 2018. The 
special master, Bernard Grofman, a professor of political science at the University 
of California, Irvine, drew the remedial plan by, inter alia, “focus[ing] on keeping 
census places and cities whole” and “aim[ing] for contiguity and compactness.”75  
For county commissioner, his map produced two districts that are majority Native, 
although he cautioned that given empirical data on Native registration and turnout, 
a 65% Native district was, in fact, a “true swing district.”76 
The 2018 special election delivered a Native majority on the County 
Commission: two out of three.77  But it would be naïve—and misleading—to end 
the telling of the San Juan County saga on November 3, 2018. As an initial matter, 
the election results belie the enormous efforts undertaken to protect Native voting 
rights in that election. In 2014, amidst the ongoing heat of the litigation over county 
commission and school board districts, the county decided to alter the way it 
conducted elections from in-person voting on Election Day to predominantly vote-
by-mail (with a single physical polling location remaining open). 78  This facially 
neutral change in election administration had a severe racially disproportionate 
effect: mail-in voting was not accessible to rural Navajo voters.79  There were also 
concerns over sufficient language assistance for Navajo voters.80  These concerns 
and others lead the Department of Justice, the ACLU of Utah, and state elections 
officials to send election monitors to ensure that everyone who wanted to vote 
could cast a ballot.81 
Election administration was not the only avenue by which the County sought 
to resist potential changes that a new redistricting plan might bring. After it became 
clear that the special master’s map would go into effect and Native candidates were 
getting ready to campaign, the eligibility of one of the candidates, William Grayeyes, 
was challenged by county officials.82 They alleged that he was not qualified to run 
 
74. Navajo Nation v. San Juan Cty., 266 F. Supp. 3d 1341, 1367 (D. Utah 2017), aff’d, 929 F.3d 
1270 (10th Cir. 2019). 
75. Navajo Nation, 929 F.3d at 1290. For more information on how Special Master Grofman drew 
his districts, see Navajo Nation v. San Juan Cty., No. 2:12-cv-00039, 2017 WL 6547635 (D. Utah. Dec. 21, 
2017).  
76. Navajo Nation, 929 F.3d at 1290. 
77. Matt Vasilogambros, Native Americans Win Crucial Races in Utah County, GOVERNING (Nov. 13, 
2018), https://www.governing.com/topics/politics/sl-native-americans-utah-midterms.html. 
78. Navajo Nation Human Rights Comm’n v. San Juan Cty., 281 F. Supp. 3d 1136, 1142 (D. Utah 
2017).  
79. Id. at 1142, 1152. 
80 . The language and ballot access issues were litigated, see id., and eventually settled. 
Settlement Announced in Navajo Nation Human Rights Commission v. San Juan County, ACLU UTAH (Feb. 
21 2018), https://www.acluutah.org/newsroom/item/1418-settlement-announced-in-navajo-nation-
human-rights-commission-v-san-juan-county. 
81. Courtney Tanner, In San Juan County, It Appears History Has Been Made With a Majority 
American Indian Commission and Conservative Firebrand Phil Lyman Wins a House Seat, SALT LAKE TRIB. 
(Nov. 7, 2018), https://www.sltrib.com/news/politics/2018/11/07/lyman-wins-house-seat-san/. 
82. Id. 
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because he did not reside in the Utah portion of the Navajo reservation.83 As a court 
later ruled, the claim was not a meritorious one.84 
Since the election, efforts have also been made to nullify the new district 
boundaries. Most prominently, a proposition was put on the ballot to consider 
expanding the size of the three-member San Juan County Commission.85  While the 
proponents of the measure claim that the racial make-up of the commissioners did 
not inspire the proposition, it is clear that the measure expresses strong displeasure 
over the districts drawn by the special master.86 The proposition was ultimately 
defeated by just 153 votes.87 More recently, those who opposed the remedial map 
supported a bill that would make it easier to divide counties in Utah.88 
The almost four-decade and ongoing saga in San Juan County encapsulates 
the broader struggle to protect Native voting rights. Its experience typifies the early 
efforts to protect Native voting rights by enforcing newly available federal laws. 
Without diminishing the importance of those efforts, they are clearly inadequate 
given the significant opposition that more muscular Native voting strength faces. 
The experience also demonstrates the entanglement of representational goals and 
voter suppression efforts. We are entering the next redistricting cycle at a time 
when manipulations of the electoral process for political gain are becoming more 
frequent.89 Native voters are already familiar with how the developing Voting Wars 
affect them: in 2016, the Native American Rights Fund sued over a newly enacted 
voter identification requirement for voting in North Dakota that disproportionately 
affected Native voters, many of whom did not possess valid ID for voting under the 
law.90 
How prolonged—and bitter—the fight for Native representation in San Juan 
County has been and remains signals the hard work that lays ahead there and 
elsewhere. Math is by no means the most formidable barrier in the way of greater 
Native representation. Deeply entrenched behavioral and attitudinal barriers, along 
with institutional insularity and personal prejudice, all conspire to make the work 




85 . Zak Podmore, San Juan County Heads into Another Controversial Special Election—and 
Possibly the First Step to a New Form of Government, SALT LAKE TRIB. (Oct. 14, 2019), 
https://www.sltrib.com/news/2019/10/14/san-juan-county-heads/. 
86. Id. 
87. Kate Groetzinger, Proposition to Change San Juan County Government Fails by Close Margin, 
KUER (Nov. 8, 2019), https://www.kuer.org/post/proposition-change-san-juan-county-government-
fails-close-margin.  
88. Zak Podmore, San Juan County May Be Vulnerable to County-Splitting Bill, SALT LAKE TRIB. (Nov. 
22, 2019), https://www.sltrib.com/news/2019/11/22/san-juan-county-may-be/. 
89. See RICHARD L. HASEN, THE VOTING WARS (2012); Daniel P. Tokaji, The New Vote Denial: Where 
Election Reform Meets the Voting Rights Act, 57 S.C. L. REV. 689 (2006). 
90. Brakebill v. Jaeger, No. 1:16-cv-008, 2016 WL 7118548 (D.N.D. Aug. 1., 2016).  The lawsuit 
eventually settled.  Brakkton Booker, North Dakota and Native American Tribes Settle Voter ID Lawsuit, 
NPR (Feb. 14, 2020), https://www.npr.org/2020/02/14/806083852/north-dakota-and-native-american-
tribes-settle-voter-id-lawsuits.  
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But while San Juan County typifies much of what makes enhancing Native 
representation hard, it also offers a glimpse of why it matters. While the 
commission used to hold its meetings exclusively in the county seat of Monticello, 
about an hour away from the Navajo Nation, the newly elected commissioners 
elected to hold every third meeting outside the county seat. And in July, 2019, the 
commission met in Navajo Nation for the first time.91 In the work session prior to 
the meeting, the commissioners devoted their time to an issue of grave concern to 
the Navajo community: the poor condition of the roads.92 The reason to care about 
fresh districts in the upcoming redistricting cycle are the governments they could 
produce: ones that are responsive and attentive to the needs of their Native 
constituents. 
 
91. Kate Groetzinger, San Juan County Holds Meeting on Navajo Nation and Discusses Worsening 
Road Conditions, KUER (July 3, 2019), https://www.kuer.org/post/san-juan-county-holds-meeting-
navajo-nation-and-discusses-worsening-road-conditions. 
92. Id.; see also Jim Carlton, After 150 Years, Navajo Win Back Political Power in Utah, WALL STREET 
J. (Nov. 4, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/after-150-years-navajo-win-back-political-power-in-
utah-11572863402. 
